THE TRUTH –DEFENSE EQUIPMENT , WARS , TERRORISM, CORRUPTION AND LASTLY DICTATOR SHIP
We are educating people how defense expenditure is establishing / making – nations and people to become billionaires , power nations through conflicts and divided policy.
we are hoping every responsible person will act as true doctor / solder / citizen to stop this venom or virus.
Arms business is doing businesses to become great economic countries or global Power Brokers at the cost of other nations , societies , people and Echo system.
Individual countries, global political leaders, Terrorists, Naxalites,, Speratiests, Cultures, Races, religions, movements, etc are creating conflicts among human beings for power , identity, superiority. They are forgetting that they are human beings. Animals and Trees are better civilized than present human life eco system.
Already Echo system is reminding human race and leaders in the form hurricanes, drought, earth quakes etc.
Power for hunger in the name of super power, wealth , power, chair, Terrorist leaders, religion leaders , superiority , individual identity etc are also causing for arms race.
The root cause is greediness for power, for money and lastly corruption. Corruption is terrorism and terrorism is corruption. The products of arms business – from nuclear bombs to ordinary pistols, armed knifes.
For example India spends US$ 500 billion dollars. Around 20 to 25 % of this money is wasted due to corruption and delays caused by individuals, arm brokers, lobbyists to earn money etc. Let us take pragmatic figure US$ 50 billlion dollars from of this US$ 125 billion waste will help to create good society to serve nation.
We the people of nation or world who are becoming police man , Solders, IAS , IPS etc to defend the nation without corruption can utilize this money for every body growth and Dreams.
If internally we are safe ,there is no need spend more for money for defense. INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTERNAL SECURITY move on same boat , road.
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND HUMAN DEFENSE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ARMS EQUIPMENT and DEFENSE MODELS or GLOBAL DOCTRINES for POWER AND ECONOMIC GROWTH.
IT IS STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE AT COST OF OTHERS – LIFE IN VARIOUS MEANS – TERRORISM, WARS, RELIGION WARS , ECHO WARS IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT , GLOBALIZATION AND LASTLY CORRUPTION.
THE INDIAN POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT AND BUREAUCRATS SHOULD BE ASHAMED OF THEM SELF’S FOR RECENT THREAT BY TERRORIST OUT FITS FROM PAKISTAN AND OTHER PLACES ON KASAB KILLING.
TERRORIST OUT FITS GIVEN TWO CITY NAMES WHERE THEY GOT ENOUGH SUPPORT . WHY THE IB ,RAW,DEFENSE , STATE POLICE ARE NOT TAKING PRIMITIVE ACTIONS, IN 26/11 OR MUMBAI BLASTS NOT A SINGLE POLITICAL LEADER EFFECTED. BUT BRAVE POLICE , ORDINARY PEOPLE FROM ALL VARIOUS COUNTRIES LOST THEIR LIFE’S. THIS IS FOR VOTES IN THE NAME OF VARIOUS WORDS / DIVISIONS ETC.
WITH CORRUPTION , POWER FOR STRUGGLE INDIANS ARE LIVING LIKE SLAVES IN SYSTEM IN THE NAME OF RELIGION,LANGUAGE , REGIONS AND CASTE ETC. THIS IS DIVIDED POLICY.
AWARENESS , CHANGE . RESPONSIBILITY , DISCIPLINE ,PROUD OF INDIANS AND HUMAN BEINGS IS KEY FOR NEW STABLE INDIA.
THE OPEN VOICE OF 122 Crore or 1.22 Billion INDIANS COUNTS – IT SHOULD BE ONE NATION , ONE INDIAN S, ONE POLICY, ONE RESPECT , ONE ACTION , ONE COMMITMENT , ONE JUSTICE – AS VOICE OF EVERY INDIAN.
THE FACTS AND FIGURES
Summary
During 2011 the sudden and dramatic popular uprisings in parts of the Middle East and North Africa, which together constituted the Arab Spring, produced diverse patterns of conflict. The events of the Arab Spring were not, however, isolated in terms of contemporary conflict trends. Rather, developments across the region served to underline some of the long-term changes that have occurred in armed conflict over recent decades. This has involved important shifts in the scale, intensity and duration of armed conflict around the world, and in the principal actors involved in violence. Together these changes point to the emergence of a significantly different conflict environment than that which prevailed for much of the 20th century.
Numbers of conflicts, 2001–11
The first year of the Arab Spring
The uprisings of the Arab Spring spread rapidly from country to country and soon affected large parts of North Africa and the Middle East. While they shared a number of traits—including large demonstrations, non-violent actions, the absence of single leaders and the use of central squares in major cities—they also differed in certain respects. The extent of the demands made by the protesters varied, ranging from improved economic situations to regime change, as did the level of violence.
While there were comparatively few fatalities in Algeria and Morocco, other countries—including Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen—were much more severely affected. The highest levels of violence were in Libya and Syria.
International reactions varied, with external support limited to a few cases. Western powers, notably France and the USA, initially supported governments in Egypt and Tunisia but then began to push for change. In the case of Libya, they quickly took an active stand against the regime, with the UN’s approval and NATO as the instrument. Over conflict in Syria, China and Russia, both of which had become increasingly critical of the international use of force, opposed Western-led efforts to sanction the ruling regime. The scope for third-party involvement in solving these crises was remarkably limited, and serious negotiations only occurred in Yemen.
The outcomes of the first year of the Arab Spring were mixed. There were examples of regime change but also cases where popular resistance was repressed. Nevertheless, Arab politics has been changed by this historically unique series of events.
Numbers of fatalities in organized violence, 2001–11
Organized violence in the Horn of Africa
For decades, the countries in the Horn of Africa—Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia—have been plagued by organized violence. While all these countries experienced state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict or one-sided violence against civilians during the decade 2001–10, non-state conflicts were by far the most common. There were 77 non-state conflicts (35 per cent of the global total) in the Horn of Africa. State-based armed conflict was less common: only 5 were recorded in 2001–10. Acts of one-sided violence were committed by 6 actors.
States in the region have demonstrated a growing tendency to become militarily engaged in neighbouring countries. For instance, both Ethiopia and Kenya have at times sent troops in support of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in its conflict with al-Shabab, which has in turn received arms and training from Eritrea.
Patterns of organized violence, 2001–10
In previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) presented information on patterns of ‘major armed conflicts’. To provide a broader perspective on organized violence, the focus has now expanded to include three types of organized violence: (state-based) armed conflicts, non-state conflicts and one-sided violence (against civilians).
Over the period 2001–10 there were 69 armed conflicts and 221 non-state conflicts and 127 actors were involved in one-sided violence. Thus, in total, there were more than 400 violent actions that each resulted in the deaths of more than 25 people in a particular year.
The extent of organized violence at the end of the decade was lower than at its beginning, although the decline was not dramatic. Moreover, while in the 1990s there were wide fluctuations in the number of conflicts, this pattern was not repeated in the 2000s, indicating that the downward trend may be a promising sign of future developments.
The Global Peace Index 2012
The Global Peace Index (GPI), produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, uses 23 indicators to rank 158 countries by their relative states of peace.
There were improvements in the overall scores of all regions apart from the Middle East and North Africa in the 2012 GPI. For the first time since the GPI was launched, in 2007, sub-Saharan Africa was not the least peaceful region. The events of the Arab Spring made the Middle East and North Africa the least peaceful region.
| Rank | Country | Score | Change |
| 1 | Iceland | 1.113 | –0.037 |
| 2 | Denmark | 1.239 | –0.041 |
| 2 | New Zealand | 1.239 | –0.034 |
| 4 | Canada | 1.317 | –0.033 |
| 5 | Japan | 1.326 | +0.032 |
| 154 | Congo, DRC | 3.073 | +0.057 |
| 155 | Iraq | 3.192 | –0.107 |
| 156 | Sudan | 3.193 | –0.038 |
| 157 | Afghanistan | 3.252 | +0.043 |
| 158 | Somalia | 3.392 | +0.021 |
EXPENDITURE
Summary
World military expenditure did not increase in 2011, for the first time since 1998. The world total for 2011 is estimated to have been $1738 billion, representing 2.5 per cent of global gross domestic product or $249 for each person. Compared with the total in 2010, military spending remained virtually unchanged in real terms. However, it is still too early to say whether this means that world military expenditure has finally peaked.
The main cause of the halt in military spending growth was the economic policies adopted in most Western countries in the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis that started in 2008. These policies prioritized the swift reduction of budget deficits that increased sharply following the crisis.
World military spending, 2011
Region |
Spending ($ b.) |
Change (%) |
| Africa | 34.3 | 8.6 |
| North Africa | 13.9 | 25 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 20.4 | -0.1 |
| Americas | 809 | -1.4 |
| Central America and the Caribbean | 7.0 | 2.7 |
| North America | 736 | -1.2 |
| South America | 66.0 | -3.9 |
| Asia and Oceania | 364 | 2.2 |
| Central and South Asia | 61.7 | -2.7 |
| East Asia | 243 | 4.1 |
| Oceania | 28.6 | -1.2 |
| South East Asia | 31.0 | 2.7 |
| Europe | 407 | 0.2 |
| Eastern Europe | 80.5 | 10.2 |
| Western and Central | 326 | -1.9 |
| Middle East | 123 | 4.6 |
| World total | 1738 | 0.3 |
The spending figures are in current (2011) US dollars.
World military expenditure, 2011
Spending figures are in constant (2010) US dollars.
The impact of austerity on military expenditure in Europe
In Western and Central Europe in particular, governments enacted austerity measures, including military spending cuts. In countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain, deficit reduction was given added urgency by acute debt crises where these countries faced being unable to meet their debt obligations, in some cases requiring bailouts from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.
The falls in military expenditure brought other policy debates into focus, including long-standing accusations from both sides of the Atlantic that European countries are failing to ‘pull their weight’ in military affairs, and renewed efforts to promote greater European military cooperation as a way to reduce costs while preserving capabilities.
The 10 largest military spenders, 2011
- At what cost of GDP and Corruption and kick backs
US military spending and the 2011 budget crisis
The US administration and the Congress attempted to agree measures to reduce the soaring US budget deficit. While these attempts did not lead to substantive cuts in military expenditure, delays in agreeing a budget for 2011 contributed to spending being lower than planned and resulted in a small real-terms fall in US military expenditure.
The rapid decade-long increase in US military spending appears to be ending. This is the result both of the ending of the Iraq War and the winding down of the Afghanistan War and of budget deficit-reduction measures.
The economic cost of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars
One of the dominating factors of the global security environment over the past 10 years, and a key factor influencing military spending in many countries, was the ‘global war on terrorism’ following the terrorist attacks on the USA of 11 September 2001. The highly militarized policy response to these attacks chosen by the USA, which included invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, had cost the USA over $1.2 trillion in additional military expenditure alone by the end of 2011, and may result in total long-term costs of as much as $4 trillion. Much lower, although still substantial, costs had also been incurred by other participants in these wars.
The reporting of military expenditure data to the UN
The number of states reporting to the UN Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures has dropped from a high of 81 in 2002 to 51 in 2011.
European states had the highest reporting rate in 2011 (31 of 48 states). The worst rates were in Africa (2 of 54 states) and the Middle East (1 of 14 states).
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have also led to huge economic costs, including costs of military forces; destruction of capital and infrastructure; disruption of normal economic activity; loss of human capital through death, injury, displacement and disruption to education; and loss of foreign investment and tourism. Full estimates for these costs are not currently available.
Military expenditure in Africa
Africa was the region with the largest increase in military spending in 2011—8.6 per cent. This was dominated by a massive 44 per cent increase by Algeria, the continent’s largest spender. Algeria’s continuous increases in recent years were fuelled by increasing oil revenues and were provided a ready justification by the activities of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), although Algeria’s regional ambitions may be a more important motive.
The terrorist activities of Boko Haram were also a major security concern for Nigeria and the military-led response to these appears to have been one factor in Nigeria’s military spending increases.However, the role of other factors, especially oil revenues, should not be ignored.
Manufacturing companies and countries data
The public spending crisis in the Global North has not yet had a large overall impact on the major companies in the arms production and military services industry (‘the arms industry’). The most likely reason for this lack of major change is that the impact of the world financial slowdown is being delayed by the structure of the arms industry.
The economic and spending uncertainties in both the USA and Western Europe will have general implications for the way in which weapon programmes are developed and implemented, and so have contributed to uncertainty as to whether arms sales will be maintained or increase at the same rate as in the past.
The US National Defense Authorization Act
The National Defense Authorization Act for financial year 2012 has sent a mixed message about the US arms industry. On the one hand, it maintains many of the USA’s largest and most costly weapon programmes, such as the F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter). Authorization to continue spending on these programmes indicates that arms sales in the US market are likely to continue largely unchanged from current levels. On the other hand, new contract rules on risk sharing between the US Government and the companies winning arms contracts mean that a potentially heavier burden will fall on the industry as these programmes develop.
Arms industry production cooperation in Western Europe
The financial crisis has seeped into the discussions on arms industry cooperation in Western Europe, although these discussions have not yet resulted in widespread increased cooperation.
West European countries have discussed and begun to implement cooperative development and production strategies for unmanned aerial systems (UASs) and in June 2011 the European Commission initiated a process for developing and producing UASs. However, these projects have not yet come to fruition, as seen in the stagnation of the Talarion project.
The military services industry
Some key military services sectors—such as maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), systems support, logistics, and training of foreign militaries—have been more resistant to the impact of the drawdown from Iraq and to the global financial instability. Their long-term growth can be attributed to a variety of post-cold war changes, including structural transformation of military needs and the decrease of in-house capabilities for ever more complex systems. It seems that pressure on public spending, which has raised the possibility that military spending will fall, will contribute to an increase in demand for outsourced services such as weapon systems MRO.
Diversification into cyber security
In addition to an increased focus on military services, companies are relying on other business strategies in an effort to maintain their bottom lines. A notable development has been the growth in acquisitions of specialist cybersecurity firms as the largest arms-producing companies attempt to shield themselves from potential cuts in military spending and move into adjacent markets.
Note our observation:
Indian Cyber security is in omnishambels. This is due to we didn’t build our own digital mother land or Digital network – Indian internet or secure Network to safe guard our interests. For example Google, Face book, Twitter etc are based out of other countries .Every network administrator, back office support worker, security specialist, software programmer , Intelligence establishments of Individual countries can monitor your data your correspondences or freedom of expressions and confidential information.
INTERNET IS OPEN TO EXPRESS AND IS GLOBAL IN FORM BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT SHOULD NOT BE MISUSED. THE PRESENT INTERNET DATA IS 80% JUNK IN NATURE. THE TRUE DATA OR INFORMATION SHOULD HELP ECONOMIES AND CIVILIZATIONS GROWTH WITH PEACE AND LOVE.
PRIVACY IS OPEN OFFICE OF OUR INDIVIDUALITY THINKING AND REQUIREMENTS OF INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS, RACES AND COUNTRIES ETC
The Indian arms industry
Many countries outside the Global North are attempting to develop a self-sustaining national arms industry. India’s efforts to modernize, upgrade and maintain the equipment of its armed forces and to expand its military capabilities have made it the largest importer of major arms.
Its domestic arms industry is also attempting to meet this demand—for example by increasing levels of technology through technology transfer—but the Indian defense industrial policy requires major reform.
The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies
The SIPRI Top 100 list ranks the largest arms-producing and military services companies in the world (outside China) according to their arms sales. Sales of arms and military services by the SIPRI Top 100 continued to increase in 2010 to reach $411.1 billion, although at 1 per cent in real terms the rate of increase was slower than in 2009. Between 2002 and 2010 Top 100 arms sales rose by 60 per cent.
The 10 largest arms-producing companies, 2010
| Company (country) |
Arms sales ($ m.) |
Profit ($ m.) |
|
| 1 | Lockheed Martin | 35 730 | 2 926 |
| 2 | BAE Systems (UK) | 32 880 | –1 671 |
| 3 | Boeing | 31 360 | 3 307 |
| 4 | Northrop Grumman | 28 150 | 2 053 |
| 5 | General Dynamics | 23 940 | 2 624 |
| 6 | Raytheon | 22 980 | 1 879 |
| 7 | EADS (trans-Europe) | 16 360 | 732 |
| 8 | Finmeccanica (Italy) | 14 410 | 738 |
| 9 | L-3 Communications | 13 070 | 955 |
| 10 | United Technologies | 11 410 | 4 711 |
Companies are US-based, unless indicated otherwise. The profit figures are from all company activities, including non-military sales.
Companies based in the USA remained at the top of the SIPRI Top 100 and were responsible for over 60 per cent of the arms sales in the SIPRI Top 100. The number of West European companies in the Top 100 declined to 30, while the Brazilian company Embraer re-entered the Top 100. Russia’s continued arms industry consolidation added another parent corporation to its top arms producers—United Shipbuilding Corporation.
Companies in the SIPRI Top 100 for 2010, by country
- Why Not Indian Companies
Country or region refers to the location of the company headquarters, not necessarily the location of production. China is excluded due to lack of data.
FACTS AND FIGUERS OF ARMS TRANSFER
The volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons grew by 24 per cent between 2002–2006 and 2007–11. The five largest suppliers in 2007–11—the USA, Russia, Germany, France and the UK—accounted for three-quarters of the volume of exports. Outside the five largest arms suppliers, China and Spain recorded significant increases in the volume of deliveries during 2007–11. While China’s exports are likely to continue to grow, Spain’s order book for ships—which account for the bulk of its exports—indicates that it will not maintain its volume of exports.
States in Asia and Oceania received nearly half of all imports of major conventional weapons in 2007–11. Moreover, the five largest recipients of major conventional weapons—India, South Korea, Pakistan, China and Singapore— were all located in the region. Major importers are taking advantage of the competitive arms market to seek attractive deals in terms of financing, offset arrangements and the transfer of technology. India, which received 10 per cent of all imports in 2007–11, is likely to remain the largest recipient of major conventional weapons in the coming years.
The trend in transfers of major arms, 2002-11
- INDIA AS MAJOR SHARE THAT IS WHY – INDIA DEFENSE ISSUES
Bar graph: annual totals; line graph: five-year moving average (plotted at the last year of each five-year period).
The impact of the Arab Spring on arms export policies
The first year of the Arab Spring provoked debate about the policies of major arms suppliers on exports to states in the Middle East and North Africa. Russian officials saw no reason to halt deliveries to any state in the region not subject to a UN arms embargo. In contrast, the USA and several major European suppliers to the region revoked or suspended some export licences to the region and in certain cases undertook reviews of their arms export policies. However, strategic and economic concerns continued to play a central role in all states’ decision-making on arms exports to the region, and the impact of the Arab Spring on arms export policies appears to have been limited.
The main importers and exporters of major arms, 2010
| Exporter | Global share (%) |
Importer | Global share (%) |
| 1. USA | 30 | 1. India | 10 |
| 2. Russia | 24 | 2. South Korea | 6 |
| 3. Germany | 9 | 3. Pakistan | 5 |
| 4. France | 8 | 4. China | 5 |
| 5. UK | 4 | 5. Singapore | 4 |
| 6. China | 4 | 6. Australia | 4 |
| 7. Spain | 3 | 7. Algeria | 4 |
| 8. Netherlands | 3 | 8. USA | 3 |
| 9. Italy | 3 | 9. UAE | 3 |
| 10. Israel | 2 | 10. Greece | 3 |
Arms transfers to South East Asia
The volume of arms transfers to South East Asia increased threefold between 2002–2006 and 2007–11. Naval equipment and aircraft with maritime roles accounted for a significant share of deliveries and outstanding orders by Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Viet Nam.
Determinants of the types and volumes of weapons sought by these six states include piracy, illegal fishing and terrorism. However, territorial disputes in the South China Sea probably play the most important role in their procurement decisions. This is borne out by defence white papers, the types of weapons acquired in 2007–11 and, in particular, a recent series of low-level maritime confrontations in disputed waters.
States in South East Asia are also making efforts to secure transfers of technology and diversify their sources of supply. Suppliers are increasingly willing to meet the demands of states in the region for extensive technology transfers in arms deals or partnerships to develop new weapon systems.
Recipient regions of major arms imports, 2007-11
- INDIA SHARE IS MORE – NOW INDIANS ARE LOOKING TO BECOME DEFENSE MANUFACTURERS
Transparency in arms transfers
The number of states reporting their arms imports and exports to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) increased in 2011 to 85, from an all-time low of 72 states in 2010. There was a notable increase in the Americas, but only one African state reported, the lowest number since UNROCA was created. An increasing number of governments have published national reports on arms exports, including Poland, which published its first reports in 2011.
Arms transfers to Armenia and Azerbaijan
Recent acquisitions, orders and procurement plans by Armenia and Azerbaijan have the potential to increase the risk of renewed conflict over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia and Azerbaijan accuse each other of pursuing an arms race.
Azerbaijan has significantly increased its volume of arms imports against a backdrop of bellicose rhetoric on the use of force to settle the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. There is limited public information on Armenia’s arms imports in recent years but during 2010 and 2011 it announced plans to procure more advanced weapon systems in connection with Azerbaijan’s procurement drive.
While a voluntary Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe (OSCE) arms embargo is in force, there are different interpretations of its status by OSCE participating states and arms continue to be supplied to both sides. Russia is a major supplier to both parties. Armenia has a limited range of potential suppliers and is overly reliant on Russia as an arms supplier. In contrast, Azerbaijan has recently concluded significant licensed production arrangements and deals with Israel, South Africa and Turkey as it seeks to use foreign technology to develop an indigenous arms industry.
NUCLEAR FACTS
Summary
At the start of 2012, eight states possessed approximately 4400 operational nuclear weapons. Nearly 2000 of these are kept in a state of high operational alert. If all nuclear warheads are counted—operational warheads, spares, those in both active and inactive storage, and intact warheads scheduled for dismantlement—the USA, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel together possess a total of approximately 19 000 nuclear weapons.
The availability of reliable information about the nuclear weapon states’ arsenals varies considerably. France, the UK and the USA have recently disclosed important information about their nuclear capabilities. In contrast, transparency in Russia has decreased as a result of its decision not to publicly release detailed data about its strategic nuclear forces under the 2010 Russia–USA New START treaty, even though it shares the information with the USA. China remains highly non-transparent as part of its long-standing deterrence strategy, and little information is publicly available about its nuclear forces and weapon production complex.
Reliable information on the operational status of the nuclear arsenals and capabilities of the three states that have never been party to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—India, Israel and Pakistan—is especially difficult to find. In the absence of official declarations, the publicly available information is often contradictory or incorrect.
World nuclear forces, 2012
| Country | Deployedwarheads | Otherwarheads | TotalInventory |
| USA | 2 150 | 5 850 | ~8 500 |
| Russia | 1 800 | 8 200 | 10 000 |
| UK | 160 | 65 | 225 |
| France | 290 | 10 | ~300 |
| China | . . | 200 | ~240 |
| India | . . | 80–100 | 80–100 |
| Pakistan | . . | 90–110 | 90–110 |
| Israel | . . | ~80 | ~80 |
| North Korea | . . | . . | ? |
| Total | ~4 400 | ~14 600 | ~19 000 |
All estimates are approximate and are as of January 2012.
The legally recognized nuclear weapon states
All five legally recognized nuclear weapon states, as defined by the NPT—China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA—appear determined to remain nuclear powers for the indefinite future.
Russia and the USA have major modernization programmes under way for nuclear delivery systems, warheads and production facilities. At the same time, they continue to reduce their nuclear forces through the implementation of New START, which entered into force in 2011, as well as through unilateral force cuts. Since Russia and the USA possess by far the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals, one result has been that the total number of nuclear weapons in the world continues to decline.
The nuclear arsenals of China, France and the UK are considerably smaller, but all are either developing new weapons or have plans to do so. China is the only one of these states that appears to be expanding the size of its nuclear forces, albeit slowly.
Stocks of fissile materials
Materials that can sustain an explosive fission chain reaction are essential for all types of nuclear explosives, from first-generation fission weapons to advanced thermonuclear weapons. The most common of these fissile materials are highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium.
For their nuclear weapons, China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA have produced both HEU and plutonium; India, Israel and North Korea have produced mainly plutonium; and Pakistan mainly HEU. All states with a civilian nuclear industry have some capability to produce fissile materials.
| Global stocks, 2011 | |
| Highly enriched uranium | ~1270 tonnes* |
| Separated plutonium | |
| Military stocks | ~237 tonnes |
| Civilian stocks | ~250 tonnes |
* Not including 171 tonnes to be blended down.
Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces
India and Pakistan are increasing the size and sophistication of their nuclear arsenals. Both countries are developing and deploying new types of nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles and both are increasing their military fissile material production capabilities.
India’s nuclear doctrine is based on the principle of a minimum credible deterrent and no-first-use of nuclear weapons. There have been no official statements specifying the required size and composition of the arsenal but, according to the Ministry of Defence, it involves ‘a mix of land-based, maritime and air capabilities’ (a ‘triad’).
In May 2011 the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, convened a meeting of the Nuclear Command Authority—the body responsible for overseeing the country’s nuclear arsenal—to assess progress towards the goal of achieving an operational triad.
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is also based on the principle of minimum deterrence but does not specifically rule out the first-use of nuclear weapons to offset India’s superiority in conventional arms and manpower.
Pakistan’s development of new short-range ballistic missiles suggests that its military planning has evolved to include contingencies for the use of ‘battlefield nuclear weapons’. This may lead to nuclear warheads being deployed on a more launch-ready posture.
Israeli nuclear forces
Israel continues to maintain its long-standing policy of nuclear opacity, neither officially confirming nor denying that it possesses nuclear weapons. However, it is widely believed to have produced plutonium for a nuclear weapon arsenal.
Israel may have produced non-strategic nuclear weapons, including artillery shells and atomic demolition munitions, but this has never been confirmed.
North Korea’s military nuclear capabilities
North Korea has demonstrated a military nuclear capability. However, there is no public information to verify that it possesses operational nuclear weapons.
At the end of 2011 North Korea was estimated to have separated roughly 30 kilograms of plutonium. This would be sufficient to construct up to eight nuclear weapons, depending on North Korea’s design and engineering skills.
According to a leaked report prepared in 2011 by the UN Security Council’s panel of experts on North Korea, the country has pursued a uranium-enrichment programme ‘for several years or even decades’. It is not known whether North Korea has produced HEU for use in nuclear weapons.
WHY WAR ZONES – EVERY BODY WANT TO BECOME NUCLEAR POWER TO DISTROY OTHER NATIONS FOR THEIR COUNTROL.
Russian–US nuclear arms control
The momentum behind treaty-based approaches to nuclear arms control and disarmament was highlighted in 2011 by the entry into force of the 2010 Russia–USA Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), which mandated additional reductions in the two parties’ strategic offensive nuclear forces.
The parties implemented on schedule the inspections, data exchanges, notifications and other measures set out in the treaty’s cooperative monitoring and verification regime. In establishing this regime—one of the treaty’s main achievements—New START continued an arms control process through which Russia and the USA have redefined their strategic relationship.
There were questions about the next steps in Russian–US arms control. Both sides acknowledged that making further cuts in their nuclear arsenals would require expanding the bilateral agenda to address tactical nuclear weapons and non-deployed warheads as well as broader strategic stability issues. The most prominent of the latter related to ballistic missile defence, which was the focus of an intensifying dispute in 2011. There was also recognition that deeper cuts in their respective strategic nuclear arsenals would require bringing the three other nuclear weapon states recognized by the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) into a multilateral nuclear arms-reduction process.
Aggregate strategic offensive arms under New START, 1 September 2011
| Russia | USA | |
| Deployed ICBMS, SLBMs and heavy bombers |
516 | 822 |
| Warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and warheads counted for heavy bombers |
1566 | 1790 |
| Deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers |
871 | 1043 |
ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile.
Nuclear proliferation concerns in Iran and Syria
International efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons remained a top priority in 2011. Two states—Iran and Syria—came under intensified scrutiny during the year for allegedly concealing military nuclear activities, in contravention of their commitments under the NPT.
A three-year investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that a building in Syria destroyed by an Israeli air strike in 2007 was ‘very likely’ to have been a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the agency. The IAEA also reported that it had credible evidence that Iran had pursued nuclear weapon-related activities in the past and said that some of the activities might still be continuing. The difficulties encountered by inspectors in both countries led to renewed calls to expand the IAEA’s legal powers to investigate NPT states parties suspected of violating their treaty-mandated safeguards agreements, even beyond those set out in the Model Additional Protocol.
The unresolved Iranian and Syrian nuclear controversies raised further doubt about the efficacy of international legal approaches, in particular the role of the UN Security Council, in dealing with suspected or known cases of states violating important arms control treaty obligations and norms. During 2011 Iran continued to defy five Security Council resolutions, adopted since 2006, demanding that it suspend all uranium enrichment and other sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities. A divided Security Council failed to take action on Syria’s nuclear file after the IAEA Board of Governors had declared the country to be non-compliant with its safeguards agreement. In the view of some observers, the lack of action set the stage for future controversies about the suitability of extra-legal measures, including the pre-emptive use of military force, in addressing proliferation concerns.
North Korea’s nuclear programme
The diplomatic impasse over the fate of the nuclear programme of North Korea remained unresolved in 2011. Preliminary discussions aimed at restarting the suspended Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of North Korea made little progress, despite renewed contacts between North Korean and US diplomats. The legal and normative challenges posed by North Korea to the global non-proliferation regime were underscored by reports that the country had been involved in covert transfers of nuclear and ballistic technologies to third countries on a larger scale than previously suspected.
Developments in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
In June 2011 the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) reached a controversial consensus agreement to tighten its transfer guidelines for uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing (ENR) equipment and technology. The NSG states could not agree on language for the imposition of certain subjective criteria; instead, they settled on conditioning the transfer of nuclear technology on signing an additional safeguards protocol with the IAEA and on the importing state being in full compliance with its IAEA obligations.
An issue at the very heart of nuclear non-proliferation is the relationship between the NSG suppliers and those states with nuclear weapons that are outside of the framework of the NPT and the NSG. The 2011 NSG plenary discussed whether the revised guidelines affected India’s eligibility to receive ENR transfers and its possible membership of the NSG.
Cooperation on non-proliferation, arms control and nuclear security
The risks of nuclear terrorism and the illicit diversion of nuclear materials continued to be the focus of high-level political attention around the globe in 2011.
The Group of Eight (G8) agreed to extend the 2002 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction—an initiative which has supported cooperative projects aimed at addressing non-proliferation, disarmament and nuclear security issues. In addition, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1977, which extended by 10 years the mandate of the committee established under Resolution 1540 to monitor and facilitate states’ compliance with their obligations under the resolution.
OPENING EYES AFER BURNING FINGUERS – TERRORISM AND CORRUPTION THROUGH BAN.
With the exception of some promising progress in South America and in South Eastern Europe, in 2011 most developments in conventional arms control were discouraging as states were not willing to modify national positions in order to facilitate agreement, either globally or regionally.
Three factors have contributed to the difficulty of developing conventional arms control. First, the huge and sustained investment that the USA has made in its military power has made it impossible to find solutions based on balance. Second, technological developments have blurred the picture of which capabilities will confer military power now and in the future. Third, the lack of agreed rules about the use of force—which may be for ostensibly constructive purposes and not only a defensive response to aggression—makes countries reluctant to give up military capabilities even if there is a humanitarian argument in favour of restraint.
Cluster munitions
The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is an example of an agreement based on the principle that, even if a given weapon delivers some military advantage, it should still be limited or banned because the humanitarian consequences of use outweigh any military benefit.
While the CCM’s parties continued their implementation in 2011, the parties to the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention failed to agree on a protocol defining rules for the use of cluster munitions and banning those with particularly harmful effects. The international community is now polarized between a group of states that have committed themselves to a total ban on cluster munitions through a separate convention negotiated among themselves—the CCM—and a group of states that are not bound by any shared rules at all, apart from the laws of war.
Multilateral arms embargoes in force, 2011
United Nations (13 embargoes)
• Al-Qaeda and associated individuals and entities • Democratic Republic of the Congo (NGF) • Côte d’Ivoire • Eritrea • Iran • Iraq (NGF) • North Korea • Lebanon (NGF) • Liberia (NGF) • Libya (NGF) • Somalia • Sudan (Darfur) • Taliban
European Union (19 embargoes)
Implementations of UN embargoes (9): • Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities • Democratic Republic of the Congo (NGF) • Côte d’Ivoire • Eritrea • Iraq (NGF) • Lebanon (NGF) • Liberia (NGF) • Libya (NGF) • Somalia (NGF)
Adaptations of UN embargoes (3): • Iran • North Korea • Sudan
Embargoes with no UN counterpart (7): • Belarus • China • Guinea • Myanmar • South Sudan • Syria • Zimbabwe
ECOWAS (1 embargo)
• Guinea
Arab League (1 embargo)
• Syria
NGF = non-governmental forces.
Developments in arms export control
Efforts to improve the technical efficiency of export control continued in 2011 in global and regional organizations and in the informal regimes of the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement. However, a common approach to assessing acceptable risk remains elusive, beyond general guidelines agreed in the 1990s.
Discussions continued in the UN on the creation of a legally binding arms trade treaty (ATT), prior to the negotiating conference to be held in July 2012. Hopes were raised that China and Russia were becoming more engaged in the process. Nonetheless, there are significant differences between states over the content and purpose of a future treaty.
Multilateral arms embargoes
The only new embargo imposed by the UN Security Council in 2011 was that on Libya. States subsequently disagreed about whether or not it permitted the supply of arms to rebel forces. The Security Council was not able to agree on imposing an arms embargo on Syria despite lengthy discussion.
The Arab League imposed its first ever arms embargo in 2011, on Syria. ECOWAS’s arms embargo on Guinea, imposed in 2009, was lifted in 2011. The European Union, in addition to its implementation of the new UN embargo on Libya, imposed three new arms embargoes during 2011, on Belarus, on South Sudan and on Syria.
Several significant violations of arms embargoes were reported during 2011, primarily by the UN panels of experts tasked with monitoring the embargoes.
Conventional arms control in Europe
The renewed interest in conventional arms control in Europe that was in evidence in 2010 could not be translated into substantial progress in 2011. By the end of the year, NATO member states had decided to stop sharing information related to the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) with Russia (which had suspended its participation in 2007).
Conventional arms control in Europe has reached a dead end, even though the need for it is largely undisputed. Unresolved territorial conflicts play a key role in blocking progress, but there is no current consensus on its specific objectives, subjects and instruments.
Confidence- and security-building measures
In most regions confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) have been elaborated as part of a broader discussion of a security regime in which the behaviour of states is rendered understandable and predictable.
In Europe, the Vienna Document is the most important element of the CSBM regime, complemented by the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies. In 2011 the OSCE participating states adopted a revised version of the Vienna Document. However, it represents at best minimal progress over the Vienna Document 1999. If this trend is not reversed, the Vienna Document regime will continue to lose military and political relevance.
In South America, members of UNASUR agreed to a series of CSBMs intended to support their wider objective of building a common and cooperative security system in the region.
REFERENCE :
SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. Based in Stockholm, SIPRI also has presences in Beijing and Washington, DC.
SIPRI was established on the basis of a decision by the Swedish Parliament and receives a substantial part of its funding in the form of an annual grant from the Swedish Government. The Institute also seeks financial support from other organizations in order to carry out its broad research programme.
SIPRI’s structure comprises the Governing Board and the Director, Deputy Director, Research Staff Collegium and support staff, together numbering around 50-60 people. SIPRI’s staff and Governing Board are international.
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The real destruction
ON AUGUST 15 1945 JAPAN SURRENDERED TO USA EARLY MORNING WITH NUCLEAR BOMB WAR
ON AUGUST 15 1947 AT 12.02 JUST AFTER MIDNIGHT BRITISH RAJ SURRENDERED WITH HUMAN WAR TO CREATE TWO COUNTRIES INDIA AND PAKISTAN AT WHAT COST ??? – 12 MILLION PEOPLE EFFECTED. THIS HAPPENED EVEN AFTER NON – VIOLENCE MOVEMENT .
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kkrkstrust 